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Sowell: Misuse of Information Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: On

MISUSE OF INFORMATION UNDER THE COMPUTER FRAUD
AND ABUSE ACT: ON WHAT SIDE OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
WILL THE SECOND AND THIRD CIRCUITS WIND UP?
Dresser-Rand Co. v. Jones, 957 F. Supp. 2d 610 (E.D. Pa. 2013)
JBCHoldings NY, LLC v. Pakter, 931 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
Robert D. Sowell*
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) has reached a breaking
point. The much-discussed issue is whether the CFAA provides a cause of
action against persons who use electronic information in a way that
violates a relevant computer-use policy.1 Four circuit courts of appeals
have held that the CFAA provides a cause of action for misuses of
information, while two have disagreed.2 In two undecided circuits, the
district courts have favored the latter interpretation.3 As the Supreme Court
recently refused to address the issue,4 these two undecided circuits will
play a pivotal role in determining the direction of the CFAA.
By way of background, in 1984, the Ninety-Eighth Congress enacted
the Comprehensive Crime Control Act (CCCA).5 In § 2102 of the CCCA,
Congress included the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, which was codified in § 1030 of Title 18 of the United States
Code.6 Shortly thereafter, Congress substantially amended § 1030 by way
of the CFAA.7 At that time, the CFAA focused primarily on criminalizing
computer hacking.8 Presently, the CFAA provides criminal9 and civil
liability10 in § 1030(a)(2) for “[w]hoever . . . intentionally accesses a
* J.D. 2014, University of Florida Levin College of Law.
1. See generally Audra A. Dial & John M. Moye, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and
Disloyal Employees: How Far Should the Statute Go to Protect Employers from Trade Secret
Theft?, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1447, 1451–62 (2013) (discussing the background related to whether the
CFAA reaches information misuses); Lee Goldman, Interpreting the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act, PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y, Fall 2012, at 1, 5–14 (discussing the issue of interpreting the CFAA
as well as judicial approaches to resolving that issue); Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1572, 1583–87 (2010) (discussing
interpretation of the CFAA and its relation to the void for vagueness doctrine).
2. See infra notes 13–16 and accompanying text.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 92, 106.
4. WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 133 S. Ct. 831, 831 (2013) (denying
certiorari).
5. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976.
6. Id. § 2102(a), 98 Stat. at 2190–92.
7. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, § 2, 100 Stat. 1213, 1213–
16.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 131–32.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2012) (“Whoever—[listing acts under the CFAA] . . . shall be
punished as provided in . . . this section.”).
10. Id. § 1030(g) (providing a private right of action).
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computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access.”11 In
§ 1030(a)(4), the CFAA reaches “[w]hoever . . . knowingly and with intent
to defraud, accesses a protected computer without authorization, or
exceeds authorized access.”12 These two phrases, “without authorization”
and “exceeds authorized access,” are the crux of a major circuit split
concerning whether the CFAA provides a cause of action against
individuals who violate computer-use policies. Adhering to a “broad
interpretation,”13 some circuits have interpreted § 1030 to cover violations
of use policies.14 In contrast, following a “narrow interpretation,”15 others
have held that § 1030 deals only with “access” and does not provide a
cause of action for violations of use policies.16
In practice, the question is frequently presented as whether an
employee, previously given authorization to access an employer’s
computer, accesses “without authorization” or “exceeds authorized access”
if that employee accesses an employer’s computer for a wrongful purpose
or misuses data after having logged on.17 Fortunately, the CFAA provides
some guidance by defining “exceeds authorized access” as “to access a
computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter
information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or
alter.”18 However, the statute fails to define “without authorization.”
Recently, two district courts addressed whether the CFAA reaches
misuses of information.19 Notably, neither of the district courts’ respective
circuit courts of appeals, the Second and Third Circuits, have addressed the
issue.20 An obvious question is whether the Second and Third Circuits will

11. Id. § 1030(a)(2).
12. Id. § 1030(a)(4). Additionally, § 1030(a)(1) also uses both the “without authorization”
and “exceed[s] authorized access” language.
13. See Dresser-Rand Co. v. Jones, 957 F. Supp. 2d 610, 615–16 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (labeling
the competing interpretations as the “broad view” and the “narrow view”); id. passim (using the
terms “broad interpretation” and “narrow interpretation”).
14. See United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v.
John, 597 F.3d 263, 272 (5th Cir. 2010); Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420–21
(7th Cir. 2006); EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 583–84 (1st Cir. 2001).
15. See source cited supra note 13.
16. See WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 207 (4th Cir. 2012);
United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
17. See Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in
Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1632–40 (2003) (discussing the CFAA’s
application “in the context of employee misconduct” and in cases of breaches of “contracts
governing the use of computers”).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (2012).
19. See Dresser-Rand Co. v. Jones, 957 F. Supp. 2d 610, 614–21 (E.D. Pa. 2013);
JBCHoldings NY, LLC v. Pakter, 931 F. Supp. 2d 514, 520–25 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
20. Dresser-Rand Co., 957 F. Supp. 2d at 616; JBCHoldings NY, LLC, 931 F. Supp. 2d at
522.
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decide the issue in the near future.21 Another question is whether the
Second and Third Circuits will interpret the CFAA narrowly or broadly.
This Comment begins by discussing the relevant facts from each district
court case. Next, this Comment delves into the circuit split and focuses on
the reasoning behind the competing views. Finally, this Comment
discusses the analysis in the district court opinions and explains why the
district courts reached the correct result.
In the Second Circuit, the Southern District of New York grappled with
the issue in March of 2013.22 In JBCHoldings NY, LLC v. Pakter, a holding
company acquired an executive search firm.23 In doing so, the holding
company employed a former owner of the acquired firm, and the former
owner signed an employment agreement with the holding company.24
According to the agreement, the former owner agreed “to help [the holding
company] build [its] executive search business.”25 The employment
agreement also provided that the former owner, as well as an additional
owner of the search firm, would not compete with the holding company.26
Approximately six months after the former owner began working for
the holding company, management for the holding company discovered
personal e-mails of the former owner on a company computer.27 The emails suggested that the former owner was directly competing with the
holding company.28 Specifically, according to the holding company, the
former owner and several coconspirators “misappropriated . . . proprietary
information, including client lists, and used these to advance their
competing business.”29 The holding company theorized that the former
owner “obtained this information either by (1) copying it to her personal
laptop and sharing it with her co-[conspirators]; (2) lifting it from [the
21. The Second Circuit may, in fact, decide the issue soon. On January 24, 2014, Judge
Covello of the District of Connecticut, in the Second Circuit, held that there was no cause of action
under the CFAA against a former employee that downloaded confidential information in violation
of the employer’s computer-use policy. Amphenol Corp. v. Paul, Civil No. 3:12-cv-00543-AVC,
2014 WL 272337, at *8–9 (D. Conn. Jan. 24, 2014). On February 20, 2014, the employer filed a
notice of appeal regarding Judge Covello’s January 24th order. Notice of Appeal at 1, Amphenol
Corp., Civil No. 3:12-cv-00543-AVC (D. Conn. Feb. 20, 2014); see also Notice of Appeal at 1,
Amphenol Corp., Civil No. 14-547 (2d Cir. Feb. 20, 2014).
22. See JBCHoldings NY, LLC, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 520–27; see also Amphenol Corp., 2014
WL 272337, at *8–9 (addressing the issue in January 2014); Targum v. Citrin Cooperman & Co.,
No. 12 Civ. 6909(SAS), 2013 WL 6087400, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2013) (addressing the issue
within the last year); Poller v. Bioscrip, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 1675(JPO), 2013 WL 5354753, at *22
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2013 ) (same).
23. JBCHoldings NY, LLC, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 518.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 519.
28. Id.
29. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 7

1750

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

holding company’s] computers using a flash drive; and/or (3) obtaining it
remotely via spyware.”30 The holding company filed a complaint against
the former owner and other coconspirators, alleging violations of the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the Lanham Act.31 Thereafter, the
former owner, as well as the other coconspirators, moved to dismiss.32
More recently, in the Third Circuit, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
addressed the issue in July of 2013.33 In Dresser-Rand Co. v. Jones, two
employees worked as managers at a company that “provide[d] technology,
product [sic] and services used for developing energy and natural
resources.”34 At that time, several company policies governed employee
behavior.35 One, the “Acceptable Use Policy,” provided that “[a]ny
unauthorized use, disclosure or transmission of [protected] information or
content [was] prohibited.”36 The “Internet Access and Usage Policy”
defined unauthorized Internet use as “[s]ending, receiving or posting
without authorization company-sensitive or privileged information.”37
Each time that an employee logged onto a company computer, the
employee was required to acknowledge a “Legal Notice and Acceptable
Use Statement” that outlined additional computer-use rules.38
During the course of their employment with the plaintiff, the two
employees began working for a new employer engaged in a similar
business.39 Before terminating their employment with the first company,
the two employees violated computer-use policies when they downloaded
company documents onto external hard drives, e-mailed company
documents to their new employer, and deleted materials on companyprovided computers.40 Thereafter, the company filed a complaint against
the two former employees for, among other claims, violations of the
CFAA,41 and the former employees moved for partial summary judgment
as to the CFAA claims.42
Without guidance from the Second or Third Circuits, the Southern
District of New York and Eastern District of Pennsylvania were left to
their own devices in choosing which side of the circuit split to follow. On
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 519–20.
33. See Dresser-Rand Co. v. Jones, 957 F. Supp. 2d 610, 614–21 (E.D. Pa. 2013).
34. Id. at 611.
35. Id. at 612.
36. Id. (second alteration in original)
37. Id. (alteration in original).
38. Id. A “Code of Conduct” also covered “conflicts of interest, competition and fair dealing,
confidentiality, privacy, protection and proper use of company assets, and other topics.” Id.
39. Id. at 611.
40. Id. at 611–12.
41. Id. at 611.
42. Id. at 611–12.
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one side, the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have adhered to
the broad interpretation and have held that violations of a computer-use
policy can provide a basis for a CFAA cause of action.43 These decisions
approach the issue in two ways: a contract-based theory or an agency-based
theory.44
The First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits employ the contract-based theory
whereby the breach of the policy itself triggers CFAA liability.45 In United
States v. Rodriguez, the Social Security Administration (SSA) maintained
electronic databases that included sensitive personal information such as
social security numbers, addresses, dates of birth, and annual income.46
The SSA established computer-use policies prohibiting an employee from
accessing the database for nonbusiness reasons.47 When an SSA employee
accessed the personal information of seventeen individuals for personal
reasons, the employee was charged with violating the CFAA.48 The
Eleventh Circuit determined that, according to the policy, the employee’s
authorization to access varied depending on his purpose.49 Following a
cursory analysis, the court held that, by violating the SSA’s computer-use
policies, the employee “exceeded his authorized access” in violation of the
CFAA.50
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit interpreted the statute broadly and held that
a bank employee “exceed[ed] authorized access” when she provided a
relative with confidential customer account information in violation of the
bank’s computer-use policies.51 The First Circuit, reviewing a motion for
preliminary injunction, held that a company would “likely prove that”52 a
former employee “exceed[ed] authorized access”53 by accessing the
company’s website in a way that violated a confidentiality agreement
between the company and former employee.54
43. See supra note 14.
44. See Goldman, supra note 1, at 5–9.
45. See United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263–64 (11th Cir. 2010); United States
v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 271–73 (5th Cir. 2010); EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d
577, 583–84 (1st Cir. 2001).
46. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1260.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1260, 1262.
49. Id. at 1263.
50. Id. at 1263, 1265.
51. United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 272–73 (5th Cir. 2010).
52. EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 583 (1st Cir. 2001).
53. Id. at 581 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
54. Id. at 581–83. In EF Cultural Travel, the former employee signed a confidentiality
agreement with the company providing that the “[e]mployee agree[d] to maintain in strict
confidence and not to disclose to any third party . . . any Confidential or Proprietary Information.”
Id. at 582. In conjunction with a third party, the former employee used that confidential information
to develop a computer program to extract proprietary pricing information from the company’s
website. Id. at 579. The former employee would then use the extracted data to undercut the
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In contrast, the Seventh Circuit employs an agency-law theory to justify
a broad interpretation.55 In International Airport Centers, L.L.C. v. Citrin,
an employee decided to terminate his employment.56 Before returning a
company-issued laptop, the employee deleted all the data in the laptop and
installed a “secure-erasure program” to prevent the data from being
recovered.57 Judge Richard Posner determined that the employee accessed
the laptop “without authorization” after acquiring an interest adverse to the
company.58 According to this theory, the agency relationship between the
principal-employer and agent-employee was the basis for the employee’s
authorization to access the laptop.59 The employee breached his fiduciary
duty to the company by resolving to quit and destroying the files within the
laptop.60 That breach resulted in a termination of the agency relationship.61
Thereafter, the employee accessed the laptop without authorization by
using it after the agency relationship had ended.62
On the other side of the circuit split, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits
interpret the CFAA narrowly and hold that violations of computer-use
policies do not provide a basis for a CFAA cause of action.63 In this camp,
the Fourth Circuit recently affirmed a decision from the District of South
Carolina that granted a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim under the CFAA.64 In WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v.
Miller, a company provided an employee with a laptop, cell phone, and
authorization to access “the company’s intranet and computer servers.”65
According to the company, the employee, while working for the company,
violated company policies by “download[ing] confidential and proprietary
company’s price scheme. Id. at 580. According to the court, the former employee likely “exceeded
authorized access” “by providing proprietary information and know-how to [the third party] to
create the [computer program].” Id. at 583. In sum, “[t]he website was open to the public, so he was
authorized to use it, but he exceeded his authorization by using confidential information to obtain
better access than other members of the public.” Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418,
420 (7th Cir. 2006) (discussing the holding in EF Cultural Travel).
55. See Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420–21. The Seventh Circuit is the only circuit court of appeals
that has employed this theory, and both the Ninth and Fourth Circuits expressly rejected the agencybased theory. WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 206 (4th Cir. 2012);
United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 862–63 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
56. Citrin, 440 F.3d at 419.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 420–21.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 207 (4th Cir. 2012);
United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
64. WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC, 687 F.3d at 201.
65. Id. at 202.
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information to a personal computer” and then using the information to
successfully procure projects for a subsequent employer.66
Reviewing the district court’s dismissal of the company’s CFAA
claims, the Fourth Circuit narrowed the issue to whether an employee that
violates a computer-use policy accesses “without authorization” or
“exceeds authorized access.”67 The unanimous panel held that an employee
“accesses a computer ‘without authorization’ when he gains admission to a
computer without approval.”68 In contrast, “an employee ‘exceeds
authorized access’ when he has approval to access a computer, but uses his
access to obtain or alter information that falls outside the bounds of his
approved access.”69 Applying the rule of lenity,70 the court construed the
CFAA narrowly and held that the CFAA only addresses “individuals who
access computers without authorization or who obtain or alter information
beyond the bounds of their authorized access.”71
The Fourth Circuit relied heavily on borrowed reasoning from the Ninth
Circuit’s en banc decision in United States v. Nosal.72 In Nosal, a former
employee solicited a company’s current employees to use “their log-in
credentials to download source lists, names and contact information from a
confidential database on the company’s computer, and then transfer[] that
information to” the former employee.73 Because that conduct violated the
company’s computer-use policies, the government charged the former
employee with violating the CFAA.74 The former employee moved to
dismiss, and the district court granted the motion.75
66. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, the company alleged that the
employee “downloaded a substantial number of [the company’s] confidential documents and
emailed them to his personal e-mail address.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
67. Id. at 203.
68. Id. at 204. Specifically, the court defined “‘authorization’ as [a] ‘formal warrant, or
sanction.’” Id. (citing THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 798 (2d ed. 1989)). Accordingly, “an
employee is authorized to access a computer when his employer approves or sanctions his
admission to that computer.” Id. (emphasis added).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 205–06. The rule of lenity requires that ambiguous criminal statutes be strictly
construed in favor of the criminal defendant. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997).
Where a statute has both criminal and civil applications, the rule of lenity applies in the civil
context as well. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004).
71. WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC, 687 F.3d at 207 (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 203, 205.
73. United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
74. Id. Specifically, the government charged the former employee with aiding and abetting
the current employees in “‘exceed[ing their] authorized access’ with intent to defraud.” Id.
(alteration in original).
75. Id. After initially denying the motion to dismiss, the district court granted the motion on
reconsideration, following the Ninth Circuit’s decision in LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka. Id.
Decided in 2009, Brekka is a precursor to Nosal. LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127
(9th Cir. 2009). In Brekka, the Ninth Circuit held that there is no cause of action under the CFAA
against an individual for sending personal e-mails containing company documents in violation of
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The initial panel reversed.76 However, on rehearing en banc, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court.77 To begin, the court looked to the
legislative history to determine that “without authorization” refers to
traditional “outside hackers,” while “exceeds authorized access” covers
“inside hackers.”78 Accordingly, inside hackers are “individuals whose
initial access to a computer is authorized but who [thereafter] access
unauthorized information or files.”79 The court also posited several
extreme examples that would follow from a broad interpretation.80 One
example was where a company’s computer-use policy prohibits using a
company computer for personal use, an employee could call a family
member from a work phone but could be criminally prosecuted if the
employee instead sends an e-mail.81 Therefore, the en banc court
interpreted the statute narrowly and held that the CFAA does not reach
violations of computer-use policies.82
Both Judge Paul Engelmayer of the Southern District of New York and
Judge Anita Brody of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania were persuaded
by the reasoning of the Fourth and Ninth Circuits.83 In JBCHoldings NY,
LLC, the company’s CFAA cause of action hinged on a violation of an
employment agreement between the company and the former owner of the
acquired executive search firm.84 Judge Engelmayer determined that the
issue was “whether an employee acts ‘without authorization’ or ‘exceeds
authorized access’ when that employee is authorized in the first instance to
access certain information, but then uses that information for an improper
purpose.”85 Stated narrowly, the issue was “whether an employee’s misuse
of an employer’s information violates the CFAA where that information
the company’s computer-use policy. Id. at 1135. The decision largely focused on the “without
authorization” language and held that that language does not reach an individual’s misuse of
information. Id. at 1132–35.
76. United States v. Nosal, 642 F.3d 781, 789 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir.
2012) (en banc). The initial panel construed the term “so” within the definition of “exceeds
authorized access” to mean “in that manner.” Id. at 785–86. In that sense, the CFAA would define
‘“exceeds authorized access”’ to mean “‘to access a computer with authorization and to use such
access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled [in that
manner] to obtain or alter.’” Id. at 785 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (2012)). According to the
panel, by qualifying the way in which an individual accesses a computer, the CFAA reaches
violations of computer-use policies. Id. at 786.
77. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 864.
78. Id. at 858.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 860.
81. Id. As another example, an employee could surreptitiously read a newspaper at work but
would risk criminal sanctions if the employee instead visited a news website. Id.
82. Id. at 863–64.
83. See JBCHoldings NY, LLC v. Pakter, 931 F. Supp. 2d 514, 522–23 (S.D.N.Y. 2013);
Dresser-Rand Co. v. Jones, 957 F. Supp. 2d 610, 616–18 (E.D. Pa. 2013).
84. See supra text accompanying notes 22–32.
85. JBCHoldings NY, LLC, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 521.
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was obtained from a computer to which the employee was permitted
access.”86
After briefly outlining the circuit split, the court noted that, even within
the Southern District of New York, interpretations of the CFAA varied.87
As to the text, the court distinguished between access and use.88 In that
vein, the court concluded that authorization to access cannot vary
depending on one’s purpose.89 Rather, should an individual violate a policy
after having permissibly accessed a computer, that conduct would simply
be a misuse of that information.90 Summarily stated, “[a]n employee acts
‘without authorization’ when he accesses a computer without permission to
do so; an employee ‘exceeds authorized access’ when he has permission to
access certain information on a computer, but accesses other information
as to which he lacks permission.”91 Therefore, consistent with the narrow
interpretation, the court held that the CFAA does not cover violations of
computer-use policies.92
While the court explicitly refused to declare the statute ambiguous, it
did note that even if the statute were ambiguous, the rule of lenity would
necessitate the same narrow construction.93 To be sure, “if Congress seeks
to make a federal crime out of an employee’s misuse of his work computer,
it is required to say so clearly.”94
Addressing the motion to dismiss, the court turned to the amended
complaint.95 According to the allegations therein, the former owner
86. Id.
87. Id. at 522. Specifically, the court cited four decisions interpreting the CFAA narrowly. Id.
(citing Advanced Aerofoil Techs., AG v. Todaro, No. 11 Civ. 9505(ALC)(DCF), 2013 WL 410873,
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2013); United States v. Aleynikov, 737 F. Supp. 2d 173, 190–94 (S.D.N.Y.
2010); Orbit One Commc’ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 692 F. Supp. 2d 373, 384–86 (S.D.N.Y.
2010); Univ. Sports Publ’ns Co. v. Playmakers Media Co., 725 F. Supp. 2d 378, 383–84 (S.D.N.Y.
2010)). In contrast, the court cited three other decisions within the Southern District of New York
interpreting the CFAA broadly. Id. (citing Mktg. Tech. Solutions, Inc. v. Medizine LLC, No. 09
Civ. 8122(LMM), 2010 WL 2034404, at *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2010); Calyon v. Mizuho Sec.
USA, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 2241(RO), 2007 WL 2618658, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2007);
Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 252–53 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d as modified,
356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004)).
88. Id. at 522–23.
89. Id. at 523. According to the court, to allow “authorization” to vary depending on one’s
purpose would impose a subjective element into the CFAA that was not intended by the enacting
Congress. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 523, 525 (concluding that the CFAA does not address “the circumstance where an
employee has permission to access certain information and then uses that information for an
improper purpose” and that Congress did not intend the CFAA to expand federal jurisdiction over
such acts).
93. Id. at 524.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 525.
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acquired the holding company’s “client lists and other proprietary
information and used that information to set up a competing enterprise,” in
violation of the holding company’s “electronic media policy.”96 Applying a
narrow interpretation, the court noted that the amended complaint did not
allege that the former owner “lacked the authority to access th[e]
information.”97 Accordingly, the holding company failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.98 Specifically, “such misuse does not
state a claim under the CFAA, because an employee does not ‘exceed[]
authorized access’ or act ‘without authorization’ when she misuses
information to which she otherwise had access.”99
In Dresser-Rand Co., the company’s CFAA claim centered on two
employees’ violations of several computer-use polices.100 Judge Brody
began her analysis with a discussion of the legislative history of the
CFAA.101 Particularly, the court cited a pre-CFAA committee report that
discussed § 1030 as addressing “breaking and entering” or trespass-type
crimes.102 Notably, that type of conduct has little to do with misuse; it has
everything to do with access or hacking. Aside from the legislative history,
the court narrowed its focus to whether the two employees “exceed[ed]
authorized access” when they violated the company’s computer-use
policies.103 As to the text, the court relied almost exclusively on the Fourth
and Ninth Circuits in reasoning that the plain meaning of the CFAA and
the rule of lenity104 necessitate a narrow interpretation.105 The court then
rejected the opposing case law as “wrap[ping] the intent of the employees
and use of the information into the CFAA despite the fact that the statute
narrowly governs access, not use.”106
Applying the narrow interpretation, the court noted that the company
had provided the two employees with “user names and passwords to
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. (alteration in original). The court did note that the amended complaint included
allegations that “someone . . . placed a flash memory drive on [the holding company’s] computer
servers . . . in an effort to surreptitiously rip information from the drives.” Id. at 525–26 (ellipsis in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Had those allegations been pleaded with the requisite
specificity, then those allegations may have sufficed to state a claim under the CFAA. Id.
100. Dresser-Rand Co. v. Jones, 957 F. Supp. 2d 610, 611–12 (E.D. Pa. 2013).
101. Id. 613–14.
102. Id. at 613 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 20 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
103. Id. at 615 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
104. Generally, before the rule of lenity applies, the court must declare that the statute is
ambiguous. LINDA D. JELLUM & DAVID CHARLES HRICIK, MODERN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 151
(2d ed. 2009) (noting that the rule of lenity “is generally applied only when the statute at issue is
both penal in nature and ambiguous” (emphasis added to last word)); see also id. at 476–77
(discussing the relationship between ambiguity and the rule of lenity).
105. Dresser-Rand Co., 957 F. Supp. 2d at 615–19.
106. Id. at 619 (emphasis added).
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access” the company’s network and database.107 Additionally, the company
provided the employees with laptops.108 According to the court, if the
employees “were authorized to access their work laptops and to download
files from them, they cannot be liable under the CFAA even if they
subsequently misused those documents to compete against” the
company.109 For that reason, even though the employees used the
company’s information for competitive purposes, the court granted the
employees’ motion for partial summary judgment on the company’s CFAA
claims.110 Consequently, relief for the company would have to come in the
form of a non-CFAA cause of action.111
Today, a major question surrounding the CFAA is whether the Southern
District of New York and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania reached the
correct result. The interpretation adopted by JBCHoldings, that the text of
the CFAA unambiguously favors a narrow interpretation, appears unfairly
dismissive.112 In fact, the existence of the circuit split suggests otherwise.
Regarding Dresser-Rand Co., by relying mostly on case law, it is unclear
whether the text, legislative history, or both require a narrow
interpretation.113 As to both cases, a better approach would be to recognize
the ambiguity and apply the rule of lenity, as well as consult the legislative
history, to reach the same conclusion. Under either approach, the CFAA
does not provide a cause of action for violations of a computer-use policy.
Beginning with the text, as noted above, the CFAA provides a cause of
action against individuals who access “without authorization” or “exceed[]
authorized access.”114 Statutory text may be deemed “ambiguous” if “two
or more reasonable people disagree as to its meaning.”115 Because
reasonable minds can differ as to the meaning of “without authorization”
and “exceeds authorized access,” those phrases are ambiguous.
As to the “without authorization” language, the crux of that phrase lies
in the definition of “authorization.” Authorization can be defined as “the
state of being authorized,”116 and “authorize” can mean “to endorse,
107. Id. at 620.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 621.
111. Id.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 93–94.
113. See supra notes 101–06 and accompanying text.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 11–12.
115. JELLUM & HRICIK, supra note 104, at 94 (“Most courts state that statutes are ambiguous
when two or more reasonable people disagree as to its meaning.”). But cf. Chickasaw Nation v.
United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001) (emphasis added) (defining ambiguity as where a “statute is
‘fairly capable’ of two interpretations”); Mayor of Lansing v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 680
N.W.2d 840, 847 (Mich. 2004) (“[A] provision of the law is ambiguous only if it ‘irreconcilably
conflict[s]’ with another provision or when it is equally susceptible to more than a single meaning.”
(second emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
116. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 146 (1993).
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empower, justify, or permit by . . . some recognized or proper authority.”117
Under the broad interpretation of the CFAA, one may argue that
“authorization” to access can vary depending on the accesser’s purpose.118
Under that approach, an employer may authorize an employee to access the
employer’s database for business purposes; however, that same employer
may deny authorization to access for personal purposes. In contrast, under
a narrow reading of the CFAA, one may argue that “authorization” to
access must be unqualified, and any violation of a policy after having
accessed under the employer’s authorization is merely a misuse of
information and not a violation of the CFAA.119 Here, an employee who
receives a username and password is presumptively authorized to access
the employer’s database; however, if that employee then impermissibly
downloads or misappropriates employer information, that employee merely
misuses the information. Regardless, “authorization” is at least capable of
two reasonable interpretations,120 and therefore the term is ambiguous.121
As to the “exceeds authorized access” language, the question is more
difficult. The CFAA defines the phrase in § 1030(e)(6) as “to access a
computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter
information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or
alter.”122 Under a broad interpretation of the CFAA, one may argue that
impermissible “obtain[ing] or alter[ing]” is equivalent to misuse.123 In
contrast, under a narrow interpretation, the definition of “exceeds
authorized access” only covers “insider hacking,”124 wherein an individual,
after having permissibly accessed a database, “accesses other information
as to which he lacks permission.”125 In this sense, “entitled” would be

117. Id.; see also United States v. Aleynikov, 737 F. Supp. 2d 173, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(discussing several dictionary definitions of “authorize”).
118. See supra text accompanying note 49; see also United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 272
(5th Cir. 2010) (“Access to a computer and data that can be obtained from that access may be
exceeded if the purposes for which access has been given are exceeded.” (emphasis added)).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 85–86, 89–90.
120. Cf. supra note 115 (discussing competing standards for determining ambiguity).
121. But see JBCHoldings NY, LLC v. Pakter, 931 F. Supp. 2d 514, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(refusing to declare the CFAA ambiguous).
122. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (2012).
123. One could also argue that the term “so” should be construed to mean “in that manner.”
See United States v. Nosal, 642 F.3d 781, 785–86 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir.
2012) (en banc). In that vein, “exceeds authorized access” would refer to the way in which
information is “obtain[ed] or alter[ed]” which speaks to using (not accessing) information. Id.
124. See supra text accompanying note 79.
125. JBCHoldings NY, LLC, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 523. For example, an employee, with a
username and password, would “exceed[] authorized access” if that employee, after permissibly
accessing the employer’s network, hacked into another employee’s e-mail account or into a
password-protected folder.
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synonymous with “authorized,”126 and “entitled so to obtain or alter” may
simply refer to whether an individual is permitted to access the
information.127 However, again, both interpretations seem reasonable, and
the statute is therefore ambiguous.
Declaring the CFAA ambiguous is a critical determination in
interpreting the statute narrowly. For one, the rule of lenity will apply,
requiring courts to strictly construe the CFAA in favor of the defendant.128
Significantly, the rule of lenity will apply even in civil applications of the
CFAA.129 Additionally, because the statute is ambiguous, courts will more
readily consult the legislative history,130 and the legislative history seems to
conclusively favor a narrow interpretation.
Looking back to the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud
Abuse Act of 1984, wherein 18 U.S.C. § 1030 was originally enacted, the
House Judiciary Committee expressed its concern for “so-called ‘hackers’
who have been able to access (trespass into) both private and public
systems.”131 In all, the report from House Judiciary Committee mentioned
some derivation of the word “hack” seven times.132 The Committee was
especially blunt in stating that “[i]t is noteworthy that section 1030 deals
with an ‘unauthorized access’ concept of computer fraud rather than the
mere use of a computer.”133
Just two years later, Congress enacted the CFAA.134 Here, Congress
established the “exceeds authorized access” language.135 By including
“exceeds authorized access” in § 1030(a) and defining that phrase in
§ 1030(e)(6), Congress removed the prior language from § 1030(a) that
covered individuals who “having accessed a computer with authorization,
use[] the opportunity such access provides for purposes to which such
126. United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 857 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“An equally or more
sensible reading of ‘entitled’ is as a synonym for ‘authorized.’”).
127. JBCHoldings NY, LLC, 931 F. Supp. at 523 (“[A]n employee ‘exceeds authorized access’
when he has permission to access certain information on a computer, but accesses other information
as to which he lacks permission.”).
128. See supra notes 70–71, 104, 114 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 70.
130. See Mayor of Lansing v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 680 N.W.2d 840, 846 (Mich. 2004)
(“A finding of ambiguity, of course, enables an appellate judge to bypass traditional approaches to
interpretation and . . . engage in a largely subjective and perambulatory reading of ‘legislative
history.’”); cf. Martin H. Redish & Matthew B. Arnould, Judicial Review, Constitutional
Interpretation, and the Democratic Dilemma: Proposing a “Controlled Activism” Alternative, 64
FLA. L. REV. 1485, 1525 (2012) (noting the plain meaning rule “dictates that when words are
linguistically unambiguous, an interpreter may not resort to external sources to contradict the
inexorable implications of that unambiguous meaning” (emphasis added)).
131. H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 10 (1984).
132. Id. at 10–11, 21.
133. Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
134. See supra note 7.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 11–12.
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authorization does not extend.”136 In its report, the Senate Judiciary
Committee illustrated its understanding of “exceeds authorized access.”137
The Committee noted that an employee might “exceed[] authorized
access” if “while authorized to use a particular computer in one
department, [he] briefly exceeds his authorized access and peruses data
belonging to [a] department that he is not supposed to look at.”138 The
Committee referred to the “exceeds authorized access” language as
covering “insider cases,”139 much like the Ninth Circuit referred to “insider
hacking.”140
It should be noted that the report from the Senate Judiciary Committee
accompanying the 1996 amendment hints that misuses of information may
be covered by the CFAA. Specifically, in discussing the penalties for
violating § 1030(a)(2)(C), the report mentions that the CFAA covers
“misusing information,” as well as theft-related issues.141 Without more,
theft of information seems like a misuse issue, not an access issue. But, the
Committee clarified that “[t]he crux of the offense under subsection
1030(a)(2)(C), however, is the abuse of a computer to obtain the
information.”142 Therefore, the CFAA does not cover the actual offense;
rather, it covers the unauthorized access that precedes the offense.143
Pending legislation also seeks to narrow the reach of the CFAA by
removing the “exceeds authorized access” language and defining “access
without authorization” to include only access, and not use.144 This
proposed amendment could indicate that Congress understands the current
language to be broad; therefore, Congress wishes to alter the plain
meaning. In contrast, the amendment could indicate that Congress
understands the text to be narrow; however, Congress nonetheless wishes
136. See S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 9 (1986).
137. See id. at 7. Here, the Committee was discussing whether to include the “exceeds
authorized access” language in § 1030(a)(3). Id. While the Committee ultimately decided to exclude
that language from (a)(3), id., “exceeds authorized access” can be found in §§ 1030(a)(1), (a)(2),
and (a)(4).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 7–8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
140. See supra text accompanying note 78–79.
141. S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 7–8 (1996).
142. Id.
143. These statements are found in a broader discussion of what is meant by “obtaining
information” within the definition of “exceeds authorized access.” Id. The Committee noted that
“obtain[]” only includes “mere observation.” Id. at 7 (quoting S. REP. NO. 99-432 at 6–7 (1986)). In
that sense, “obtain” is akin to “access,” i.e., an individual “obtains” a file by merely accessing that
file.
144. See Aaron’s Law Act of 2013, S. 1196, 113th Cong. § 2; Aaron’s Law Act of 2013, H.R.
2454, 113th Cong. § 2; see also Zoe Lofgren & Ron Wyden, Introducing Aaron’s Law, a
Desperately Needed Reform of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, WIRED (Mar. 5, 2014, 9:30
PM), http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/06/aarons-law-is-finally-here/ (discussing CFAA’s flaws
and whether Aaron’s Law will improve the CFAA).
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to add clarity to combat prosecutorial abuse. While the pending legislation
provides little guidance on that point, the weight of the legislative history
indicates that the CFAA prohibits only unauthorized access, not
unauthorized use.145
Thus, the Southern District of New York in JBCHoldings NY, LLC and
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Dresser-Rand Co. correctly
interpreted the CFAA narrowly. Whereas these two decisions reach the
correct result, each court’s rationale leaves something to be desired. In
addressing whether the CFAA provides a cause of action for misuses of
information, a better method would be to declare the statute ambiguous.
Because the CFAA is ambiguous, courts will more readily consult the
legislative history that favors a narrow interpretation. Where that much is
unclear, the rule of lenity will require that courts interpret the CFAA
narrowly in favor of a criminal or civil defendant.
Therefore, when the issue inevitably reaches the Second and Third
Circuits, those courts should interpret the CFAA narrowly and hold that
there is no cause of action under the CFAA for misusing electronic
information. Additionally, in light of a recent trend favoring a narrow
interpretation,146 the Second and Third Circuits will likely follow suit.
Soon enough, in both New York and Philadelphia, there will be no cause
of action under the CFAA for violating a computer-use policy.

145. See supra text accompanying notes 78–79, 82, 101–02.
146. See Thomas E. Booms, Note, Hacking into Federal Court: Employee “Authorization”
Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 543, 565–67 (2011)
(discussing the trend favoring a narrow interpretation in both the Second and Third Circuits); see
also supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text (noting that neither the Second nor Third Circuit
has addressed whether the narrow interpretation should control at the appellate level and that the
Second Circuit may soon address the issue).
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